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ECONOMIC DREAM OR ENVIRONMENTAL 
NIGHTMARE? THE LEGALITY OF THE "BUBBLE 
CONCEPT" IN AIR AND WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL 
Jack L. Landau· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Excessive costs and unwarranted intrusions into private business 
affairs are becoming increasingly familiar criticisms of federal and 
state environmental regulations. l The claims are not totally with-
out foundation. The Council on Environmental Quality reports 
that industries spent over $30 billion in 1978 on air, water, and 
solid waste pollution abatement equipment. I The steel industry 
• Instructor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College; Air Quality 
Planning Consultant for the City of Portland, Oregon; J.D., Northwestern School of Law of 
Lewis and Clark College, 1980; B.A., Lewis and Clark College, 1975. 
1 See, e.g., Sullivan, Environmental Regulations and Economic Development: Reflections 
from Muddy Water, [19781 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMEN-
TARY 3: "[T1he environmental movement is a reactionary anti-growth movement that in its 
present form is wholly irreconcilable with economic development." See also Heath, Environ-
mental Quality and Economic Development, [19791 AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 46; Murray & 
Seneker, Industrial Siting: Allocating the Burden of Pollution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1978); 
Comment, Industrial Site Selection: Existing Institutions and Proposals for Reform, 55 
NEB. L. REv. 440 (1976). 
• COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALlTY-1979: TENTH ANNUAL 
REPoRT 666-67 (1979). The Council estimates that the cumulative investment in air pollu-
tion control for the years 1978-87 will exceed 300 billion dollars. Id. This estimate has been 
translated into a bill for each American family that totals over 600 dollars each year. Heath, 
supra note I, at 47. The steel industry has been particularly hard hit by the costs of pollu-
tion control. Industry advocates claim that pollution control is responsible for a 4.6 percent 
increase in the wholesale price of steel. Nulty, A Brave Experiment in Pollution Control, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 1979, at 120; Steelmakers Seek U.S. Concessions, Wall St. J., Feb. I, 
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alone has invested $6 billion in pollution control equipment to 
date, and expects to spend nearly $4 billion more by 1985.8 Such 
expenditures cannot help but freeze investment capital and drive 
up consumer prices to some significant extent. 
Much of this problem is a product of the manner in which this 
nation has chosen to control its pollution: government regulation.4 
Traditionally, pollution has been controlled by a government 
agency simply telling a firm how much it can and cannot pollute, 
chimney-by-chimney, pipe-by-pipe. Compliance has usually been 
guaranteed by threats of fines or shutdowns. The rub is that no 
government has the time, the personnel, or the money to deter-
mine what would be the most cost-effective way for a firm to meet 
the myriad pollutant limitations. II Instead, regulatory agencies 
largely rely on uniform standards that require all polluting activi-
ties of a certain industry type, size, or location to comply with es-
sentially the same requirements. Consequently, even if firms could 
devise cheaper ways to achieve the same result, there is no incen-
tive to do SO.8 Small wonder that the federal pollution control pro-
1980, at 6, Col. 1. U.S. Steel recently decided to close twelve steel operations in eight states, 
cutting the company's total employment by 13,000, reportedly as a result of "excesaive envi-
ronmental spending requirements." 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1571 (Nov. 30, 1979). 
Certainly industry estimates of the impact of pollution control costs have been overesti-
mated. But that such expenditures have a significant impact on the nation's economy can-
not be denied. 
• Nulty, supra note 2, at 120. 
• "One way to begin a survey of pollution control legislation and administration in the 
United States is simply to note that, at least with regard to the air pollution problem, gov-
ernment has had an almost neurotic fixation on regulation." Krier, The Pollution Problem 
and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429, 459-60 (1971). 
• Administrative and legislative bodies inherently have more limited acceas to technical 
information and p088ible alternative means of production than the businesa they seek to 
regulate. Even if the information were more readily available, government agencies are 
simply not equipped to digest it sufficiently to formulate the most efficient abatement 
measures on a factory-by-factory or river-by-river basis. 
Reed, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Applying Theory to Practice, 12 ARIz. 
L. REv. 511, 513-15 (1970). See also W. Foskett, D. Klaus & J. Haberle, Balancing the 
Objectives of Clean Air and Economic Growth: Regulated Markets in Emisaion Reductions 
17 (Urban Institutes Interim Report, June, 1979). 
Economists have devoted a great deal of attention to the problems of air pollution and 
inefficiency in government regulation. See, e.g., Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality 
Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. '253 (1974); Wolozin, The Eco-
nomics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 277 (1968); Crocker, 
Some Economics of Air Pollution, 8 NAT. REs. J. 236 (1968). For a defense of regulation see 
Hagevik, Legislating for Air Quality Management: Reducing Theory to Practice, 33 J.L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 369 (1968). 
• Indeed, if there is any more effective way to reduce pollution, traditional regulatory 
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gram has met such vigorous resistance from businesses and 
industries. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has not been deaf to 
such criticism. In the past five years it has attempted in several 
ways to incorporate notions of economic efficiency into its regula-
tory program.7 At the forefront of these proposed regulatory re-
forms has been the "alternative emission reduction options policy," 
better known as the "bubble concept." 
The basic idea behind the bubble concept is to define a source of 
pollution for regulatory purposes not in terms of individual smoke-
stacks and pieces of machinery, but rather as whole units, as if an 
imaginary bubble were placed over the entire combination of chim-
neys and buildings making up a single plant. Industries would then 
be responsible for the total emissions or effluents from the plant, 
not just the individual pieces of equipment. This would allow the 
industry to reduce pollution in the plant, within the imaginary 
bubble, in the most cost-effective way, as long as the total emis-
sions or effluents from the plant do not exceed an amount specified 
by regulations.8 
For example,9 picture a steel manufacturing plant that is re-
quired to reduce particulate emissions by a certain number of tons 
per year. There are two main sources of particulates at this plant: a 
blast furnace and an open-hearth furnace. The cost of reducing 
particulate pollution from the blast furnace is approximately 
$8,500 per ton, while the cost of reducing the same amount of pol-
lution from the open-hearth furnace is $35,000 per ton. Clearly, the 
manufacturer would like to reduce the pollution from the blast fur-
nace instead of the open-hearth furnace at a savings of over 
$26,000 per ton. The bubble concept allows the manufacturer to do 
just that. It provides the possibility of having the proverbial cake 
and eating it too. The polluter is allowed to reduce the pollution in 
policy encourages firms to hide such information. Otherwise, the new technique might be· 
come a standard requirement. See T. Rothermal, The Economic Effects of Environmental 
Regulations on the Pollution Control Industry 33 (Arthur D. Little, Inc. Report, Sept. 1978). 
7 E.g., EPA's emission offset policy. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979). The agency has also en· 
couraged states to experiment with such concepts as emission density zoning, transferrable 
emission rights, marketable permits, and emission taxes. See Clark, New Approaches to 
Regulatory Reform: Letting the Market Do the Job, 32 NAT'L J. 1316 (1979). 
• See Nulty, supra note 2, at 120-21; Clark, supra note 7, at 1317-18. See also 44 Fed. 
Reg. 71,780, 71,781 (1979). 
• This example is taken from an actual test case developed by Armco Steel, in Mid· 
dletown, Ohio. Nulty, supra note 2, at 121. 
744 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:741 
the cheapest way possible, while air quality itself is not sacrificed. 
The EPA has attempted to apply this policy to a number of dif-
ferent air pollution control programs: new source performance 
standards, prevention of significant deterioration, emissions offsets, 
and state implementation plans. There has even been discussion 
concerning the possibility of applying the bubble concept to cer-
tain water pollution control programs. 
Predictably, industries have greeted EPA's efforts with a great 
deal of enthusiasm.10 President Carter's chief inflation fighter Al-
fred Kahn has called the bubble concept "an economist's dream."ll 
Environmentalists, however, have viewed it as something of a 
nightmare and have attacked its legality at every turn. 12 
This article analyzes the ways in which EPA has attempted to 
apply the bubble concept and the struggles that have occurred in 
nearly every case. A brief summary of each of the pollution control 
programs involved is provided, followed by a description of the va-
riation of the bubble concept applied to each of those programs. 
An analysis of the industrialist and environmentalist responses to 
each of the bubble policies is included. Finally, some conclusions 
are drawn as to the efficacy of each of the proposed bubble policies 
as well as to the propriety of the bubble concept itself. 
II. THE BUBBLE CONCEPT IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 
A. New Source Performance Standards 
The bubble concept made its debut in a series of EPA regula-
,. The concept was originally suggested to EPA by the nonferrous smelting industry and 
the Department of Commerce in 1972. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 323 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). It has since been supported by other industries as well. See 10 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1645-46 (Dec. 14, 1979). One industry, E.!. DuPont deNemours, claims it 
can save more than $65 million in controlling particulates alone by applying the bubble 
concept to its operations. Nulty, supra note 2, at 121. The Council on Wage and Price Sta-
bility also has expressed support for the concept and suggests it be expanded as broadly as 
possible. 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 2357-58 (April 10, 1979). 
11 Address by Alfred Kahn, Air Pollution Control Association, Seventh Governmental Af-
fairs Seminar, "The Clean Air Act-What's Happening?" at 7 (E. Beery ed. June 1979). 
,. A number of environmentalists, like the Sierra Club, feel that the bubble concept is 
simply illegal. See Brief for Petitioners Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund at 26-
67, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle.-F.2<i-, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Others criticize 
it because it would create tremendous administrative and enforcement difficulties. See 10 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1645 (Dec. 14, 1979); Comment, EPA's Widening Embrace 
of the "Bubble Concept": The Legality and Availability of Intra-source Trade-offs, 9 
ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10027 (1979). For a discussion of the policy objections to the bubble 
concept, see text accompanying notes 213-22 infra. 
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tions13 implementing section 111 of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970.14 It was, however, a short-lived appearance. The 
bubble concept as applied in those regulations was invalidated by 
the courts a little over two years after the first proposal.16 
The 1970 Act set out a number of new federal air pollution con-
trol programs. Nationwide ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS's) were required,!8 with the responsibility of attaining 
those standards left to the states by means of "state implementa-
tion plans" (SIP's).I'J Several kinds of emission limitationsl8 were 
also prescribed by the new Act. Maximum amounts of pollution 
were defined for motor vehicles,18 for sources of hazardous air pol-
lutants,1I0 and, in section 111, for certain new sources':u 
For these new sources the emission limitations were to be espe-
,. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416 (1975). 
If Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1683 (1970). The first Clean Air Act was passed in 1963. 
Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 3921 (1963). It was amended by the Clean Air Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). Substantial revisions were enacted in the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970. The latest version of the nation's air quality legislation is found in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 42 u.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. 
11977) [hereinafter also cited as the Clean Air Act.] On the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970 see Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 1066-1147 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). See also Strelow, Reviewing the Clean 
Air Act, 4 EcOLOGY L.Q. 583 (1975); Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congres-
sional Cosmetic? 61 GEO. L.J. 153 (1972). 
II ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
11 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109, 84 Stat. 1679 (1970). 
Two types of standards were required by the 1970 Amendments. "Primary" standards were 
to establish the maximum concentration of an air pollutant that could be allowed without 
endangering public health. "Secondary" standards were to establish maximums to protect 
public welfare. 
17 Id. § 110, 84 Stat. 1680. The state implementation plans were to be a blueprint for 
attainment of the ambient standards by federally-mandated deadlines. They were to include 
"emiBBion limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations ... ," 
provisions for monitoring of air quality, and procedures for the review and permitting of 
new sources. 
,. Emission limitations are not to be confused with ambient air quality standards. The 
former are controls on the amount of pollution that can be allowed from a single source. 
The latter are maximum allowable concentrations in the open air. 
,. Id. § 202, 84 Stat. 1690 . 
.. Id. § 112, 84 Stat. 1685. The 1970 Amendments defined hazardous pollutant as "an air 
pollutant for which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which . . . may cause 
or contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitat-
ing reversible, illneBB." Id. § 112(a)(I), 84 Stat. 1685. 
11 Id. § 111, 84 Stat. 1683. Only new sources that "contribute significantly" to the pollu-
tion problem were subject to the new source performance standards. EPA was required to 
determine which industry categories qualified as significant contributors and publish a list 
of those source types along with the standards that were to apply to them. Id. § 
111(b)(I)(A), 84 Stat. 1684. 
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cially stringent. The limitations, known as "new source perform-
ance standards" (NSPS) were to reflect "the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of 
continuous emission reduction . . . [EPA] determines has been 
adequately demonstrated."n The question, of course, was what 
constituted a "new source" to which these strict standards would 
apply. Section 111 ambiguously defined the term as "any station-
ary source, the construction or modification of which . . . " oc-
curred after a certain date.13 A "stationary source" in turn was de-
fined as "any building, structure, facility, or installation, which 
emits or may emit any air pollutant. "24 
In 1971, when EPA promulgated its first set of regulations21i con-
cerning section 111, it did not comment at all on the statutory defi-
nitions of "new source" and "stationary source." It simply quoted 
the section 111 definitions verbatim.IG 
In 1975, however, after much prodding by nonferrous industry 
advocates and the Department of Commerce,27 the Agency adopted 
a form of the bubble concept. In a new set of regulations interpret-
ing section 111, EPA redefined "stationary source" to include not 
just "buildings, structures, facilities" and the like, but also combi-
nations of facilities.lIS The imaginary bubble, in other words, was 
placed over an entire plant, instead of each piece of machinery. 
There was a catch. The expanded definition of "stationary source" 
only applied to existing sources undergoing modifications. All 
newly constructed sources were subject to the stringent section 111 
NSPS's on a building-by-building, facility-by-facility basis. Ex-
isting sources, though, could avoid the NSPS~s entirely if, when a 
new piece of equipment was added to the plant, emissions were 
I. Id. § 111(a)(I), 84 Stat. 1683 (emphaais added). 
I. Id. § 111(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1683. In order for a source to fall within the definition, the 
construction or modification must occur after the publication of the new source performance 
standards applicable to that source. 
I. Id. § 111(a)(3), 84 Stat. 1683. 
I. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (1971) . 
.. Id. 
I. See note 10 supra . 
.. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416, 58,418 (1975). The regulation stated: 
Stationary source means any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or 
may emit any air pollutant and which contains anyone or combination of the following: 
(1) Affected facilities; 
(2) Existing facilities; 
(3) Facilities of the type for which no standards have been promulgated in this part. 
Id. (emphaais added). 
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reduced elsewhere in the same source-the same "combination of 
facilities" -so that in the end there would be no net increase in 
emissions from the source.lI• 
EPA's new regulations were taken to task by both industry and 
environmental advocates in ASARCO, Inc. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.80 ASARCO and other industry petitioners thought 
EPA did not go far enough, claiming the bubble concept should 
have been expanded to include newly constructed as well as ex-
isting sources.81 The environmentalists, represented by the Sierra 
Club and others, argued that the plain language of the Clean Air 
Act precluded adoption of any form of the bubble concept. Section 
111, they argued, defined "source" in terms of any "building, struc-
ture, facility, or installation ... , " all of which are in the singular. 
I. [d. at 58,419. "[M]odification shall not be deemed to occur if an existing facility under-
goes a physical or operational change where the owner or operator demonstrates . . . that 
the total emission rate of any pollutant has not increased from all facilities within the sta-
tionary source .... " [d. 
An example of how EPA intended the bubble concept to work would be as follows. XYZ 
Steel Co. owns a steel mill that currently emits 500 tons of sulfur dioxide per year. XYZ Co. 
plans to expand its operations by installing a new smelter at the steel mill. The new smelter 
will add another 200 tons of sulfur dioxide to the airshed each year. The company, however, 
can clean up sulfur dioxide emissions in the existing mill by at least 200 tons per year, so 
when the new smelter begins operations the total emissions from the mill taken as a whole 
will not increase at all. The law requires modifications to comply with the NSPS's only if 
there is an increase in emissions from the "source." Since the EPA regulations would con-
sider the entire steel mill to be a source, the new smelter would not be subject to the strin-
gent NSPS's because the emission reductions from elsewhere in the mill have prevented the 
new smelter from increasing emissions from the source. 
As for applying the bubble concept to new sources, the agency commented that section 
111 of the 1970 Amendments plainly required the application of NSPS's to newly con-
structed industries, and that trading emission reductions for increases in order to avoid 
compliance with that requirement would be contrary to law: 
If the bubble concept were extended to cover new construction large sources of air pollu-
tion could avoid the application of new source performance standards indefinitely. Such 
sources could replace worn out or obsolete facilities with new facilities of the same type. 
If the same emission controls were adopted no overall emission increase would result. In 
this manner the source could continue indefinitely without ever being required to up-
grade air pollution control systems to meet standards of performance for new facilities. 
[d. EPA's reasoning seems to beg the question. The real issue was what Congress intended 
the term "source" to mean. If it means combinations of facilities, then it follows that, at 
least within the context of section 111, both new and existing polluting activities should be 
treated similarly since the Act made no distinctions between new sources and modifications 
of existing ones. EPA also failed to articulate why existing "sources" should be given more 
flexibility than new construction . 
.. 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Strangely, this case received almost no attention in law 
reviews. See Comment, D.C. Circuit Rejects Use of the "Bubble Concept" in Applying New 
Source Performance Standards, 8 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10052 (1978). 
II ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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The Act, they contended, did not contemplate combining any of 
these single components.32 Furthermore, according to the Sierra 
Club, the use of the bubble concept would contravene the very 
purpose of the Clean Air Act, which is to "protect and enhance" 
air quality. II To these petitioners the bubble concept seemed to 
merely provide a loophole that would allow polluters to "delay 
cleanup efforts and confound enforcement. "14 
EPA attempted to justify its regulations by citing section 
111(b)(2), which permitted the agency to "distinguish among clas-
ses, types and sizes within categories of new sources" for the pur-
pose of establishing NSPS's.l& This language, the agency asserted, 
granted it great discretion in defining the term "stationary source." 
Therefore, the EPA regulations, being clothed in such broad statu-
tory discretion, should survive the challenges of the Sierra Club 
and ASARCO.18 
A divided court of appeals rejected the arguments of ASARCO 
and EPA, and held for the Sierra Club. Judge Wright, writing for 
the majority held that any version of the bubble concept was in-
compatible with the language and purpose of the Clean Air Act. 17 
The statute, said Judge Wright, plainly refers to "source" in terms 
of single components. Nowhere is the concept of multiple facilities 
or other source components ever mentioned. The agency, therefore, 
had "no authority to rewrite the statute" as it attempted to do.IS 
Judge Wright turned to the purpose of the Act and to section 
111 to further augment his conclusion that the bubble concept was 
not appropriate. Citing the "protect and enhance" language of the 
Clean Air Act,18 he concluded that the bubble concept would, at 
.. Id. at 325, 326. 
sa Comment, D.C. Circuit Rejects Use of the "Bubble Concept" in Applying New Source 
Performance Standards, supra note 30, at 10052. 
s, Comment, EPA's Widening Embrace of the "Bubble Concept": The Legality and 
Availability of Intra-source Trade-offs, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10027, 10027 (1979) . 
•• Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1683. 
Be ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 327 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
• 7 Id. at 329. "[WJe find that any version of the bubble concept is inconsistent with the 
Act and contrary to its purpose." Id. (emphasis supplied) . 
.. Id. at 326-27. 
The regulations plainly indicate that EPA has attempted to change the basic unit to 
which the NSPS's apply from a single building, structure, facility, or installation-the 
unit prescribed in the statute-to a combination of such units. The agency has no au-
thority to rewrite the statute in this fashion. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
a. The purpose clause is actually from the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 
101(b)(l), 81 Stat. 485 (1967). 
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best, serve to merely maintain air quality. Thus, it would fall fa-
tally short of the congressional mandate.40 
As a final argument to support the majority opinion, Judge 
Wright attacked the internal inconsistency of EPA's NSPS bubble 
concept. By interpreting "source," as used in section 111, to mean 
one thing for newly constructed polluters and another thing for 
modifications of existing plants, the agency, he complained, cre-
ated unnecessary and undesirable confusion. This confusion he in-
sisted was further proof of the error of EPA's ways}l 
Despite all of Judge Wright's apparent animosity towards the 
bubble concept, he left in a footnote a curious comment that could 
serve as a loophole for the entire holding. Although EPA's defini-
tion of "source" was invalid, the agency, Judge Wright said, re-
mained free to define the components of "source," particularly the 
term "facility," in a broader fashion}2 Indeed, the footnote con-
ceded that EPA's definition of a facility, "which this court accepts 
. . . indicates the units designated . . . under this definition are 
usually larger than individual machines or single pieces of equip-
ment, and are sometimes whole plants."43 This statement would 
seem to flatly contradict the holding of the case. If a "source" is 
"any . . . facility . . . " and a "facility" is a whole plant, then 
there is no effective difference. The law of commutative proper-
ties44 would seem to suggest that in spite of the court's protesta-
tions, a "source" is, after all, a combination of polluting activities.46 
•• ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
• , [d. at 328 . 
•• [d. at 324 n.17 . 
•• [d. Why Judge Wright emphasized the term "facility" is uncertain. Perhaps it was be-
cause the term is the most ambiguous. A standard dictionary defines the term as "something 
(as a hospital, machinery, plumbing) that is built, constructed, installed, or established to 
perform some particular function." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 812-13 (P. 
Gove ed. 1971). The legislative history offers no definition of the term . 
.. If A=B, and B=C, then A=C . 
•• Reconsider the example involving XYZ Steel Co. at note 29 supra. Under the pur-
ported holding of the majority, XYZ Steel could not avoid the application of NSPS's. The 
new smelter is a "facility" or "installation" under any definition of the terms, and a facility, 
according to Judge Wright, equals a source. The new emissions from the smelter cannot be 
offset by emission reductions elsewhere in the steel mill because the rest of the steel mill is 
treated as a different source. As a result, the emissions from the new smelter, itself a source, 
qualify as increases and thus the smelter is subject to NSPS's. 
Under the reasoning supplied by footnote 17 of the majority opinion, a totally different 
result occurs. If EPA simply redefines the entire steel mill as a facility, then the entire steel 
mill will be treated as a single source. Since the majority insists that "facility" equals 
"source," then only modifications that produce an increase in emissions from the steel plant 
taken as a whole will be subject to NSPS regulation. The XYZ Steel Co. could then offset 
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The majority opinion gave little attention to EPA's claim that 
the regulations were supportable as a valid exercise of statutory 
discretion. In a footnote, Judge Wright attempted to discredit the 
agency argument by reasoning that the statute relied upon by EPA 
merely allowed the agency the discretion to set different standards 
for various source classifications, not to rewrite the definition of 
"source" itself.·6 The judge provided no elaboration or further 
discussion. 
It is this rather cursory treatment of the discretion issue that 
prompted a concurring and a dissenting opinion from the other 
judges ruling on the case. Judge Leventhal's concurrence chided 
the Wright opinion for not recognizing a greater amount of discre-
tion in the section 111(2)(b) passage.·' Although the section did 
not grant the agency such far-reaching exemption authority as the 
bubble concept would involve, he suggested that it did allow EPA 
to "set more liberal standards for modified facilities than for newly 
constructed facilities that perform the same function.·8 Still, not 
all modified facilities would be subject to the less stringent stan-
dards. A case-by-case cost benefit analysis would be necessary to 
support such a decision.·· 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge MacKinnon asked why Judge 
Leventhal's rationale should not be carried to its logical extreme. If 
the agency is allowed by section 111(b)(2) to set different stan-
dards for different source classifications, why should it not also be 
able to set a standard requiring nothing at all?GO "No reason," 
wrote Judge MacKinnon, "has been advanced why the 'standards' 
that EPA is directed to promulgate cannot in certain cases be stan-
dards of nonregulation."Gl The bubble concept was simply a case of 
discretionary nonregulationU of a source classification and there-
the emissions from the new smelter by improvements elsewhere in the plant, and the 
NSPS's could be avoided completely. The result is the same as if a bubble concept were 
applied. All that was required was a change in labels. See ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 
319,324 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
•• Id. at 326 n.24 . 
.. Id. at 330 . 
•• Id . 
•• Judge Leventhal reasoned that the authority to perform such case-by-case analysis was 
inherent in the § 111(b)(2) discretion to "distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within 
categories of new sources" for the purpose of establishing NSPS's. Id . 
•• Id. at 331. 
., Id . 
•• Judge MacKinnon cited no cases to support his assertion that EPA could promulgate 
"standards of nonregulation." There do not appear to be any directly on point. 
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fore should have been upheld. IS 
Judge MacKinnon then addressed the majority opinion's treat-
ment of the Clean Air Act definition of "source." The language of 
section 111, he said, does not necessarily preclude the incorpora-
tion of a bubble concept into NSPS regulations.u The statute does 
refer to the components of "source"-building, structure, facility, 
and installation-in the singular. However, he suggested, Judge 
Wright failed to consider the meaning of the source components 
themselves. What, for example, does the term "facility" mean? 
Does the fact that it is listed in a singular form necessarily mean 
that it encompasses only a single activity or piece of machinery? 
Such operations as a medical facility and nuclear power facility be-
lie any notion that the term "facility" is limited to referring to a 
single activity or machine. The incorporation of a form of the bub-
ble concept then, according to Judge MacKinnon, cannot be so 
easily dismissed as being in conflict with the language of the Clean 
Air Act.1I11 Evidently he was more aware of the consequences of the 
majority opinion's marginal discussion of the "source"-"facility" 
relationship than was Judge Wright. 
Neither the concurring nor the dissenting opinions referred to 
Judge Wright's reliance on the purpose of the Clean Air Act and 
the supposed internal inconsistency of the EPA regulations. These 
arguments, too, are shaky grounds upon which to base so sweeping 
a decision." The purpose clause of the Act does refer to the pro-
The situation could be analogized to "discretionary nonenforcement." There are a large 
number of cases that hold that an agency's decision not to prosecute where discretion is 
allowed is quite valid, and in many cases is unreviewable by the judiciary. See, e.g., Her-
nandez v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1974); United Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. 
Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), all'd, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952). This matter is, 
however, the subject of some controversy, and some courts are evidently beginning to hedge 
on the wide discretion traditionally accorded administrative agencies. See, e.g., Ausperger v. 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975). For a strongly stated 
case against discretionary nonenforcement see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
215-304 (2d ed. 1979). 
It is clear that EPA could not refuse to regulate a firm simply because it would be troub-
lesome or costly. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2005-lO (D.C. Cir. 1979) • 
.. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
If Id . 
.. Id. at 333-34. 
II Still, there is precedent for making such leaps of faith. The entire prevention of signifi-
cant deterioration program was called into existence on the basis of judicial interpretation 
of two words. See note 66 infra. 
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tection and enhancement of the nation's air quality:i7 However, in 
the same sentence it also refers to the promotion of "the produc-
tive capacity of the population .... "1i8 The bubble concept would 
certainly be consonant with that aspect of the Act's stated pur-
poses. Why focus on one part of the purpose section to the exclu-
sion of the rest? Moreover, simply because a purpose of the Act is 
to reduce pollution it does not follow that any instance of simple 
air quality maintenance subverts that purpose. Under the 1970 Act 
numerous sources of pollution were not even regulated, yet these 
instances were never held to contravene the basic purpose of the 
Act. liS 
The fact that EPA chose to apply the bubble concept only to 
modifications of existing sources should not mean that the bubble 
concept in any form is invalid. Inconsistency does not always lead 
to invalidity. so A term can take on as many different shades of 
meaning with varying contexts as Congress demands.s1 Judge 
Wright's opinion simply assumes, without any elaboration, that 
Congress did not intend "source" to be treated differently depend-
ing on whether it is new or existing. 
In sum, although the court held the bubble concept to be invalid 
in this case, the weaknesses of the court's reasoning left it open to 
considerable question. And, in fact, some of the arguments of the 
concurrence and dissent eventually resurfaced with greater success 
.. See text accompanying note 39 supra .. 
18 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 101(b)(1), 81 Stat. 485 (1967). See W. 
ROGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 282 (1977). Professor Rogers asks why the 
S8Dle "productive capacity" language was ignored in favor of the "protect and enhance" 
language in justifying the requirement of preventing significant deterioration of air quality. 
See note 66 infra. The implication here is certainly not that the purpose of the Clean Air 
Act is to foster economic development. But at the very least, this phrase expresses congres-
sional awareness of the fact that productivity is an important consideration in the develop-
ment of air quality policy . 
•• For eX8Dlple, the 1970 Act did not specify any uniform emission standards for existing 
sources, only for new ones within specified categories. See notes 20-21 supra . 
•• Indeed, Judge Wright's argument that the inconsistency of the EPA regulations indi-
cates invalidity could instead have served to indicate that the bubble concept should have 
been applied not only to modifications but to new sources as well. This is, in fact, what 
ASARCO argued. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
• , For an eX8Dlple of a term defined in two different ways in the S8Dle act see text accom-
panying notes 188-94 infra. There is, of course, a "canon" of statutory construction that 
words are presumed to be defined consistently. However, this is only a presumption. More-
over, that canon, like all canons of construction has an equally valid opposite. As Llewellyn 
remarked in his classic article, "[Tlhere are two opposing canons on almost every point." 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401, 404 (1949). 
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in a different regulatory context: the prevention of significant dete-
rioration program. 
B. Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
EPA regarded the ASARCa decision as only a limited setback. 
The agency reasoned that although the bubble concept was legally 
unacceptable in the NSPS context, it might fit very nicely in a dif-
ferent arena.81 The chosen stage for the second appearance of the 
bubble concept was the 1978 prevention of significant deterioration 
(PSD) regulations,88 required by the newly enacted Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977.84 
While the ASARCa controversy was stirring in court, Congress 
amended the 1970 Clean Air Act.81 One of the most important of 
the new amendments was the adoption of the judicially created 
non-degradation policy." According to the new Act, areas in which 
.. "Although the EPA interpretation was overturn~d by a United States court of appeals 
. . . there is no reason to believe that the Congress in late 1977 did not regard the definition 
which had existed as law since 1975 as being well suited to its purposes in the PSD pro-
gram." 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380, 26,394 (1978) . 
.. Id. at 26,380. See Comment, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: The 1978 Regu-
lations, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 275 (1979) . 
.. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685,42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. I 1977). On the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 see Davia, Kurtock, Leap & Magill, The Clean Air Act of 1977: Away 
from Technology-Forcing? 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 1 (1977); Easton & O'Donnell, The Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977: Refining the National Pollution Control Strategy, 27 J. AIR 
POLL. CONT. A. 943 (1977); Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Re-
treat from the Technology-Forcing Strategy? 15 URBAN L. ANN. 103 (1978). On the preven-
tion of significant deterioration program, see deNevers, Some Alternative PSD Policies, 29 
J. AIR POLL. CONT. A. 1139 (1979); Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial Plants, 
[1979] ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Monograph No. 28) 7-15; RatHe, Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration and Nonattainment, [1979] ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Monograph No. 27) 47-67; RatHe, 
The New Clean Air Act: Getting Clean and Staying Clean, [1978] ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA)(Monograph No. 26) 10-18; Comment, Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air 
Quality: The Clean Air Act Amendments and Utah's Power Generating Industry, [1977] 
UTAH L. REv. 755 . 
•• ASARCO was actually decided after the 1977 Amendments were passed, but the court 
based its opinion on the 1970 version of § 111. The two versions of this section are virtually 
identical in the relevant parts. 
II The Clean Air Act Amendments said nothing about air quality planning in areas that 
were cleaner than the national ambient air quality standards. EPA promulgated contradic-
tory regulations in response to this legislative vacuum. In one set of regulations the agency 
announced that no significant deterioration of air quality would be allowed in such clean air 
areas. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,384 (1971). In another set of regulations the agency said air quality 
could deteriorate to the secondary ambient air quality standards. 36 Fed. Reg. 11,398 (1971). 
In 1972, the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations sued EPA over these regula-
tions, claiming no deterioration of air quality in clean air areas should be allowed. The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia agreed in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaua, 344 F. Supp. 
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air quality is cleaner than the national ambient air quality stan-
dards are not allowed to simply deteriorate up to the standards; 
they must stay clean, only being allowed small increments of air 
quality degradation under specified conditions.87 One of those con-
ditions is that all major sources, that is, all sources with the poten-
tial to emit more than a specified amount of pollution,88 are sub-
ject to a technology-based emission limitation conforming to the 
"best available control technology" (BACT).89 This emission limi-
tation is to be at least as stringent as the applicable NSPS.70 Ma-
jor sources are also required to provide preconstruction monitoring 
and analysis of the air quality impact of the new polluter.71 The 
term "source," however, is not defined in this new section of the 
Clean Air Act. This and other questions were left to EPA to re-
solve by regulations.71 
253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally 
divided court sub nom., Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). The Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977 adopted the holding of the Sierra Club court in Part C of the Act. §§ 160-169, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. I 1977). On the Sierra Club decision, see Stewart, Judging 
the Imponderables of Environmental Policy: Judicial Review under the Clean Air Act, in 
APPROACHES To CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 95-105 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978); Hines, A 
Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of 
Clean Air and Clean Water, 63 IOWA L. REv. 643 (1977); Kramer, Economics, Technology, 
and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161,222-30 
(1976); Note, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus: "On a Clear Day . . ." 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 739 
(1974); Note, The Clean Air Act and Significant Deterioration of Air Quality: The Contin-
uing Controversy, 5 ENVT'L An. 145 (1976); Comment, The Nondegradation Controversy: 
How Clean Will Our "Clean Air" Be? [1974] U. ILL. L.F. 314; Comment, Review of EPA's 
Significant Deterioration Regulations: An Example of the Difficulties of the Agency-Court 
Partnership in Environmental Law, 61 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1975) . 
.. The 1977 Act divides areas that are cleaner than the secondary NAAQS's into three 
classes. It then sets maximum allowable increases in ambient air pollution that vary accord-
ing to the area classification. Clean Air Act § 162, 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (Supp. I 1977). 
.. Only "major emitting facilities" are subject to the PSD conditions. The Act defines 
"major emitting facilities" in terms of two categories. First, if a source falls within a list of 
industry categories that are deemed to be especially significant polluters then it is major if it 
"emits or has the potential to emit one hundred tons per year or more of any pollutant." Id. 
§ 169(1),42 U.S.C. 7479(1). There are nineteen such categories listed in the Act. Id. Second, 
any other sources, regardle88 of industry type, are major if they "emit or have the potential 
to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any pollutant." Id. The new Act also 
subjects "modifications" of major emitting facilities to PSD review. Id. § 169(2)(c), 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(2)(c) . 
.. Id. § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) . 
• 0 Id. § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). The new source performance standards section re-
mains substantially intact in the 1977 Act. Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
71 Id. § 165(a){7), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(7) . 
•• EPA did so in June 1978. Two sets of regulations were promulgated at that time. First, 
the agency i88ued "Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementa-
tion Plans," which described the minimum requirements states had to meet in setting up 
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In the new PSD regulations, EPA did two things that bore a 
striking resemblance to the NSPS bubble concept. First, it gave an 
expansive definition of the term "source." The regulations inter-
preted the word to mean "any structure, building, facility, equip-
ment, installation, or operation (or combination thereof) . ... "73 
Second, regarding "modifications" of sources, the agency said that 
BACT and preconstruction air quality monitoring would not be re-
quired if "zero net emissions would attend the change."74 
In other words, like the pre-ASARCa NSPS regulations, ex-
isting sources undergoing equipment modifications could avoid 
stringent, expensive control requirements if offsetting emission re-
ductions were developed under the "bubble" of the same plant. 
Newly constructed sources of any size were still, in accordance 
with ASARCa, subject to applicable NSPS's, and newly con-
structed major sources in a clean air area were required to meet 
the BACT requirement. 
EPA added one qualification. If a modification involved a piece 
of equipment that produced too much pollution, then the BACT 
requirement applied regardless of any offsetting emission reduc-
tions a firm could arrange.711 
state PSD programs. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380 (1978). Second, EPA published "Approval and 
Promulgation of State Implementation Plans," which set out the federal PSD plan to be in 
effect until such time as a state plan has been adopted. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388 (1978). The two 
regulations are identical, hence, for the sake of convenience, only the latter will be cited 
herein . 
.. [d. at 26,404 . 
.. [d. at 26,394. 
70 The definition of too much pollution in this case depended on the type of industry 
involved. If the source was one of the nineteen listed in § 169(1) of the Clean Air Act then 
the bubble concept should not be used when the modification produced 100 or more tons 
per year of any pollutant. If, on the other hand, the source did not fall into one of the 
special industry categories then the bubble could not be used when the modification pro-
duced 250 or more tons per year. 
An example will clarify. Return to the example of XYZ Steel Co. with its 500 tons per 
year steel mill and a planned 200 tons per year modification. Assume that the steel mill is 
located in an area currently cleaner than any secondary NAAQS. Assume also that there has 
been no new source performance standard promulgated for the type of new smelter that is 
to be installed. The company would like to apply the bubble concept and arrange 200 tons 
per year of emission reductions elsewhere in the steel mill to make room for the new 200 
tons per year smelter. If the company were allowed to do this it could avoid expensive PSD 
review because there would be no net emissions increase from the plant taken as a whole. 
But the EPA regulations would not have allowed this to take place. A steel mill is one of the 
special industry categories listed in § 169(1). If a modification of one of those listed indus-
tries were to exceed 100 tons per year of any pollutant irrespective of offsetting emission 
reductions elsewhere, then the bubble concept cannot be invoked. XYZ's new smelter is 
projected to emit 200 tons per year of sulfur dioxide. The modification being too large, the 
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This application of the bubble concept was also challenged in 
the court of appeals76 by industry and environmental petitioners. 
Once again, industry representatives bemoaned the fact that the 
bubble concept was not applied broadly enough.77 And the envi-
ronmentalists, harkening back to the ASARCO decision, claimed 
any version of the bubble concept would be illegal.78 
EPA defended its version of the bubble concept with mostly 
vague references to the purpose of the Clean Air Act and its PSD 
sections.78 It also cited section 169(1), which defined "major emit-
ting facility" in terms of such "sources" as mills, refineries, smelt-
ers, and plants.80 All of these terms, the agency argued, suggest 
that "source" refers to groups of polluting units.81 
company cannot apply the bubble concept, and the requirements of BACT, monitoring, etc. 
will have to be met. If the smelter were projected to emit 99 or fewer tons per year, the 
bubble concept could be applied under EPA's regulations, and the PSD review requirements 
could have been avoided . 
•• Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
.. Brief for Industry Petitioners on the Major Modification and Bubble Concept Issue 
[sic) at 22-27, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "[T)here is 
simply no need to impose such a regulatory burden and its accompanying cost and delay 
upon sources which do not increase emissions and which often improve and enhance rather 
than deteriorate air quality." [d. at 27-28. 
'" Brief for Petitioners Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund at 32-49, Alabama 
Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
.. Brief for Respondent Environmental Protection Agency at 92-96, Alabama Power Co. 
v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
For example, in defending the use of its limited version of the bubble concept EPA simply 
stated, "a total exemption from the section 165 requirements would contravene the basic 
purposes of the 1977 Amendments." [d. at 96. What are those purposes? EPA did not say. It 
did not even cite the 1977 Amendments. The agency did, however, cite a portion of the 
legislative history that stated that the purposes of the PSD regulations include "a frame-
work for stimulating improved control technology; protection of air quality values; and ful-
fil[ment) of the goals set forth in the purpose provisions." H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 151 (1977) quoted in Brief for Respondents, supra, at 96. There was no discussion 
of why the bubble concept does not comply with these purposes. 
Similarly, EPA argues for its definition of "modification" by commenting that "the defini-
tion and the use of the term in the regulations are entirely consistent with the intent of the 
Act." Again, there was no elaboration as to what exactly constitutes the intent of the Act 
and why the EPA regulations are consistent. Id. at 98. 
The agency also cited ASARCO as support for its use of the bubble concept. The case, 
said EPA, "upholds the use of the bubble concept in PSD preconstruction review. The sta-
tionary sources to which section 165 preconstruction review requirements apply are not sin-
gle facilities, but are combinations of facilities." Id. at 92. This assertion is puzzling indeed, 
since Judge Wright's opinion stated quite clearly that any version of the bubble concept 
would be illegal. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
I. Clean Air Act § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (Supp. I 1977) . 
• , Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 96. 
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The court, in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,82 a decision that in-
volved a great number of important PSD issues,83 grappled with 
the contention of all three sides and came to a series of rather sur-
prising conclusions. Since the PSD sections of the Act contained 
no definitions of the term "source," the court first looked for a 
statutory foundation for its opinion.84 It found such a basis in sec-
tion 111(a)(3), the new source performance standard definition of 
"source."811 Why section 111(a)(3) when it clearly came from a non-
PSD section? The court gave two reasons. First, other parts of the 
PSD sections expressly incorporate NSPS definitions for defini-
tional purposes.88 The section 111 definition of "modification," for 
instance, is plainly incorporated by section 169.87 Second, the court 
expressed concern that the meaning of the term "source" should 
be consistent throughout the Clean Air Act.88 Using this reasoning 
as justification, the court then compared the wording of the section 
111(a)(3) definition of "source" with the definition included in the 
EPA PSD regulations. The EPA regulations included three 
terms-"equipment," "operation," and "combination 
thereof'-that section 111(a)(3) did not. Consequently, the court 
held, EPA's inclusion of the extra verbiage was unsupportable.8e 
Yet the Alabama Power court did not rule that "source" does 
not encompass combinations of polluting activities. On the con-
trary, it expressly disavowed this conclusion.eo Combinations of 
polluting units can be included under the regulatory rubric of 
"source," but only if the statutory language is adhered to.SI Al-
though EPA cannot expand on the statutory components of 
"source," it is free to define quite expansively the source compo-
"' 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
la The case is a consolidation of thirty-seven different lawsuits involving over two dozen 
separate issues of statutory interpretation covering nearly every aspect of EPA's 1978 PSD 
regulations. For an analysis of the case see Landau, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle: An End 
to a Decade of Controversy over the Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality? 
10 ENVT'L L. 585 (1980) . 
•• Alabama Power Co. v. C08tle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2038 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
•• Clean Air Act § 111(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3)(Supp. I 1977). 
II Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2038 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
• 7 Clean Air Act § 169(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(c)(Supp. I 1977). 
.. "Given no expression of any contrary intent in the Act or in the legislative history 
regarding these definitions, we must assume that the meaning of a particular term is to be 
consistent throughout the Act." Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2039 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) . 
•• Id. 
00 Id . 
• , Id. 
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nents themselves. The terms "facility," and "installation," for ex-
ample, could be interpreted broadly enough to encompass an en-
tire plant. e8 This is exactly the same language that appeared in 
Judge Wright's footnote and in Judge MacKinnon's dissent in 
ASARCO. e8 Indeed, the Alabama Power opinion cited ASARCO 
for this proposition." Yet, Alabama Power came to an entirely dif-
ferent conclusion as to the validity of the bubble concept. 
The court considered the bubble issue more directly in ruling on 
EPA's treatment of the term "modification."el EPA's PSD version 
of the bubble concept, which limited its application to "modifica-
tions" under a certain size to the exclusion of new construction and 
large modifications, was invalidated. Over the objections of the en-
vironmentalists, the court said that EPA had no authority to con-
dition the use of the bubble concept in this manner." Still, the 
industry petitioners' position was not adopted without some quali-
fication. The court inferred two preconditions from the Clean Air 
Act. First, any emission reductions to be used in a bubble exchange 
must be "substantially contemporaneous. "e7 Second, the offsetting 
changes must be within the same source." Upon what section of 
the Act the court relied for the creation of these two conditions is a 
mystery, for none are cited. The latter condition arguably follows 
from the definition of the bubble concept itself, since intra-source 
tradeoffs are the focus of the concept. The former condition, how-
ever, gives reason to pause. Why should the exchanges be required 
to be contemporaneous? Why could not a source create an emis-
sion reduction at a convenient time and save it for later use? There 
would, in such a case, be no difference in air quality. If anything, 
the air quality would be worse under the court's rule, since there is 
no incentive to reduce emissions early on. Sources are, in fact, en-
couraged to wait until emissions reductions can actually be con-
sumed, the latest possible moment. The issue is quite similar to 
that of "banking" emission offsets under the EPA nonattainment 
offset policy." Under that policy states are allowed to permit 
.. [d. 
.. See text accompanying notes 42-55 .upra. 
M Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2039 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
.. [d. at 2042-45 . 
.. [d. at 2042 . 
.. [d. at 2044. The court expressly declined to define this term. [d . 
.. [d . 
.. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979). See notes 120-27 and accompanying text infra. 
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sources to save emission reductions for use at some later date. 100 
The court, however, did not say why the banking of emission re-
ductions should be treated differently in such similar contexts. 
As for the environmentalists' contention that there should be no 
bubble concept at all, the court responded with two assertions: 
first, that Congress intended the bubble concept to be included in 
the PSD regulatory contexpol and second, that ASARCa was not 
controlling here. l02 The first assertion was not supported by any 
specific reference to the Clean Air Act, but rather by an appeal to 
the scheme of the PSD part as a whole. Congress recognized, the 
opinion stated, that industrial plants undergo certain routine alter-
atiQns almost continuously. The legislature did not intend that 
each and everyone of these routine changes should be accompa-
nied by PSD review, especially if the routine change was accompa-
nied by a simultaneous offsetting emission reduction elsewhere in 
the same plant.l03 The court stated that the purpose of the PSD 
sections is to regulate increases in pollution.l04 With the bubble 
concept no increases would ever occur. "Congress," the court said, 
"wished to apply the permit process . . . only where the industrial 
changes might increase pollution in an area, not where an existing 
plant changed its operations in ways that produced no pollution 
increases. "1011 
Although the conclusion is laudable, the reasoning is somewhat 
circular. True, the PSD part is intended to apply only to increases. 
But whether or not there is an increase depends upon whether the 
bubble concept is allowed in the first place. Whether or not there 
is an increase depends upon how the term Hsource" is defined. 
Here the court seems to make a fundamental mistake in reasoning. 
The bubble concept does not derive from the term "increase," but 
rather from the term "source." The fact that the court had already 
ruled that EPA could effectively define "source" to include combi-
nations of polluting activities made the court's discussion of in-
creases and PSD purposes rather academic, if not confusing. 
100 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979). 
101 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2043 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
101 [d. at 2044. 
lOS [d. at 2043. 
10. [d., citing Clean Air Act § 160(5),42 U.S.C. § 7470(5)(Supp. I 1977), which states that 
the PSD program is intended to "assure that any decision to permit increased air pollution 
in any area. . . is made only after careful evaluation of the consequences of such a decision 
...... (emphasis added). 
10. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2043 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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Since the real crux of the issue depends on the term "source," 
and the court resolved that issue in favor of the bubble concept, 
the question becomes what happened to the ASARCO decision in 
Alabama Power? The two cases seem to flatly contradict one an-
other. Both interpreted the section 111 definition of "source," yet 
came to different conclusions as to the validity of the bubble 
concept. 
The court gave four reasons why it thought there was no conflict 
between ASARCO and Alabama Power. First, there is a difference 
between the regulations involved: "[t]he present EPA regulation 
[PSD] allows offsets within a 'source'; it does not, in light of our 
decision in this case, allow offsets within any 'combination of facili-
ties.' "108 This argument, by itself, begs the question as it neglects 
the matter of why the ASARCO bubble policy could not also have 
been fashioned out of the term "source" when the identical lan-
guage was involved. 
The second reason proffered was that the ASARCO case only 
stated that the bubble concept was not appropriate to the NSPS 
program, "but such is clearly not the case with PSD."107 The court 
offered no further illumination on this point. It is especially uncon-
vincing in light of the fact that the ASARCO court was very clear 
in expressing its sentiments regarding the bubble concept. Any 
version of the bubble concept was regarded as incompatible with 
the purposes of the Act.l08 
The third reason for distinguishing ASARCO was that the ex-
press purpose of PSD is to ensure that economic growth considera-
tions are compatible with clean air constraints. lOB The bubble con-
cept, the court opined, is "precisely suited" to this purpose.110 This 
however, is a non sequitur. It does not follow that because a given 
mechanism is suited to the purpose of the Act, it is therefore sanc-
tioned by the Act. Intermittent control strategies, for example, are 
arguably suited to the "economic considerations" purpose, yet they 
have been expressly disallowed. 111 
The final distinction between the two cases with respect to the 
, .. [d. at 2044. 
'0'1 [d. 
'08 See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
, .. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2043 (D.C. Cir. 1979), citing Clean Air 
Act § 160(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3)(Supp. I 1977). 
110 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 ERC. 1993, 2043 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
111 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975). 
1980] BUBBLE CONCEPT 761 
bubble issue is most troublesome. Congress, the court noted, was 
aware of the bubble regulations at issue in ASARCa when it en-
acted the 1977 Amendments. And although the court was "reluc-
tant" to go so far as to say that Congress expressly approved the 
NSPS bubble concept, still it noted "the Conference Committee 
approved the congressional policy as enacted at that time in ex-
isting EPA regulations."lU The court did not elaborate. This is un-
fortunate, for it is difficult to understand why, if Congress ap-
proved the existing EPA regulations, the ASARCa court held 
them invalid. 
The four reasons given by the court simply do not add up. There 
is too much similarity between the cases for ASARCa to be ig-
nored. That is not to say that the court erred in approving the 
bubble concept. On the contrary, the court's holding on the source 
definition issue settled the question as a matter of statutory con-
struction. But there remains a conflict between ASARca and Ala-
bama Power that the court neglected to adequately handle. The 
court should have acknowledged the conflict and overruled 
ASARCa. 
As a result of the Alabama Power decision, EPA has recently 
adopted revisions to the PSD regulations.1l3 In the new regula-
tions, EPA has followed very closely the suggestions of the court of 
appeals. The terms "equipment," "operation," and "combination 
thereof" have been deleted, and in their places the agency has of-
fered new definitions of "building, structure, facility, or installa-
tion," the terms used by the Clean Air ActY4 Those terms, accord-
ing to the new regulations, include a "grouping of activities on 
contiguous or adjacent properties and under common control."llII 
In addition, the special conditions attending the use of the bubble 
concept or modifications were excised in response to the court's 
decision. 118 
As a result, it appears that the first full blown, court-sanctioned 
bubble policy lies just around the corner, now that comments have 
been received and final regulations have been promulgated by 
EPA. II" 
111 Alabama Power Co. v. Castle, 13 E.R.C. 1993, 2044 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
na 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (1980). 
lU [d. at 52,731. 
,,& [d. 
"8 [d. at 52,699. See text at note 75 supra. 
"7 EPA asked the court of appeals for a stay until June I, 1980, to give the agency time 
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C. Nonattainment Area New Source Review 
The similarities between the bubble concept and the EPA emis-
sion offset policy are often noted.1l8 Both do involve tradeoffs of 
emission reductions in one area for emission increases in another. 
However, the two concepts are not totally identical, and the differ-
ences between them have resulted in the bubble concept having 
limited application in the nonattainment context. 
The emission offset policy originated in 1976119 as a result of the 
apparent conflict between the 1970 Clean Air Act nonattainment 
provisions120 and the necessity for some sort of economic 
-particularly industrial-development in areas that violated the 
national ambient air quality standards. To avoid the economic 
crunch that would attend a no-growth policy, EPA fashioned in an 
interpretive rulingl2l a system of emission tradeoffs. New or ex-
panding polluters could be allowed in nonattainment areas pro-
to adopt new regulations. 10 ENVIR. REp. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 2002 (Feb. 15, 1980). After 
reviewing over 4,000 pages of commentary from 250 persons, the agency closed the comment 
period on the proposed regulations and announced that it would publish the final revisions 
by May. Id. at 2147 (March 21, 1980). The regulations were finally promulgated in August, 
1980. 
III See, e.g., Clark, supra note 7, at 1316-18; Landau, Who Owns the Air? The Emission 
Offset Concept and Its Implications, 9 ENVT'L L. 575, 583 (1979). 
110 Actually the concept may have originated earlier than that. In 1974, the Oregon De-
partment of Environmental Quality proposed that new sources should be allowed to locate 
in nonattainment areas if they could clean up existing pollution enough to make room for 
the pollution to be added by the new source. Pollution Tradeoffs Proposed, Oregon Journal, 
Oct. 10, 1974, at A4, col. 1. In 1976, an amendment to the Clean Air Act was proposed by 
steel industry advocates that was substantially similar to the Oregon suggestion. The 
amendment was very controversial, however, and the 1976 legislative session adjourned 
before action could be taken on the tradeoff proposal. See R. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFF-
SETS: TRADING SELLING AND BANKING 6 (Conservation Foundation Issue Report 1980). 
II. The 1970 Amendments simply required that states "prevent the construction or modi-
fication of any new source ... which the state determines will prevent the attainment or 
maintenance of national ambient air quality primary or secondary standards." Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, § 110, 84 Stat. 1680 (1970). The 1970 Amendments seemingly made 
no provision for the possibility of additional pollution in a nonattainment area. See Costle, 
Reasonable Goals for SIP Revision, 29 J. AIR POLL. CONT. A. 6 (1979). EPA's offset policy 
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict between growth and nonattainment. 41 Fed. Reg. 
55,524 (1976). On the development and substance of the emission offset policy see LIROFF, 
supra note 119; Landau, supra note 118; Quarles, supra note 64, at 15-22; Raffle, supra note 
52, at 6-47; Raffle, supra note 64, at 6-10; Rosenburg & Friedman, Air Quality and Indus-
trial Growth: The Location of New Sources of Pollution in Non-Attainment Areas, 11 NAT. 
RES. L. 523 (1979); Comment, The Trade-off Policy: Solution to the Dilemma of the Clean 
Air Act? 1 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 352 (1976). 
111 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976). 
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vided, among other things,1II the new polluters arranged sufficient 
emission reductions in the geographic vicinity to more than offset 
the pollution that the new industry would introduce. lIB The 1976 
interpretive ruling did allow an expanding source to offset new 
emissions by creating "offsets" within the same plant, however, the 
ruling still required a net benefit in air quality to result from the 
transaction. II. A simple one-to-one tradeoff, as allowed in the bub-
ble concept, was not permitted. The ruling also provided a special 
emission limitation and other requirements for new sources locat-
ing in nonattainment areas,llll which could not be avoided by a 
bubble-type tradeoff. lie 
In 1978, EPA began to consider modifying the emission offset 
interpretive .ruling to conform to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments.117 At that time several EPA staff members suggested that 
II. The other requirements included compliance with a technology-based emission limita-
tion conforming to the "lowest achievable emission rate," compliance with all applicable SIP 
requirements at other plants under common ownership, and a "net benefit" to ambient air 
quality in the affected area at the conclusion of the tradeoff. [d. at 55,528-29. 
, •• [d. at 55,529. 
, .. [d. at 55,526. 
[d . 
It should be noted that in many cases the emission reductions can be obtained by im-
provements in a facility already owned by the developer of the source. This would be 
particularly true in cases where the new emissions would come from the expansion of an 
existing source .... It should be stressed that this ruling is not a "status quo" or OIJle-
for-one emission rule. 
.. & See note 122 supra. 
, •• For an example of the impact of EPA's policy reconsider the XYZ Steel Co., with its 
200 tons per year proposed smelter. Assume that the steel mill is located in an area that 
currently violates primary standards for sulfur dioxide, the major pollutant emitted by ~e 
steel mill. Assume also that no new source performance standards have been promulgated 
for the type of smelter involved. If the bubble concept could be applied, XYZ Co. would 
simply reduce the sulfur dioxide pollution from the steel mill by 200 tons per year. The 
smelter could then operate free of any special emission limitations or other requirements, as 
long as the total emissions output of the steel mill taken as a whole does not increase. EPA's 
offset policy, however, would not have allowed this to occur. Under the offset policy the steel 
mill would have to arrange more than 200 tons per year offsetting emission reductions. The 
emission reductions, in fact, would have to be sufficient to present a net benefit to ambient 
air quality. In addition, the new smelter would have to apply enough control technology to 
keep its emissions to the "lowest achievable emission rate." 
"7 The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments expressly adopted the EPA offset policy, but 
only on an interim basis. The new act provides that EPA's interpretive ruling will remain in 
effect only until July I, 1979. By that time states are required to include in their state 
implementation plans their own mechanism for accommodating growth in nonattainment 
areas. Clean Air Act § 129, codified as a footnote to 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I 1977). The 
only minimum requirements the states must adhere to are that new sources must comply 
with the lowest achievable emission rate limitation and that "reasonable further progress" 
towards the attainment of federal air quality standards not be threatened at any time. [d. § 
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the bubble concept should be included in the new regulations.128 
Several others in the agency however, notably Assistant Adminis-
trator David Hawkins, expressed great reluctance to apply the 
bubble concept to any nonattainment programs.129 After several 
months of intra-agency bickering, a compromise was reached.180 
The bubble concept would not be allowed in the federal offset pol-
icy, but states would be free to adopt any system of tradeoffs they 
might desire in their state implementation plans. This compro-
mise, and the policy justifications for it, appear in the revised 
emission offset interpretive ruling, promulgated in January, 
1979.131 The agency stated that prior to approval of a SIP, there is 
no guarantee that air pollution will be reduced sufficiently to meet 
Clean Air Act requirements. Therefore, until the SIP is approved, 
"the need to reduce new emissions through [emission offset] re-
quirements is particularly great. . . . "132 Once the SIP has been 
approved, there is a statutory guarantee that reasonable further 
progress will be made toward the attainment of federal stan-
dards.133 Therefore, states should have more freedom to allow the 
trading of emission reductions, the goal of meeting standards being 
in no way threatened by the use of the bubble concept.134 
This policy was reiterated in the new PSD regulations promul-
gated after the publication of the Alabama Power decision.13I De-
173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503. The Act lista several vaguely worded options the states may choose to 
adopt. The first basically describes a case-by-case offset mechanism of the type included in 
EPA's policy. [d. § 173(I)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(I)(A). The second provides that new source 
growth is allowed provided the new pollution will not exceed an "allowance" permitted for 
new pollution. This provision, commonly known as the "growth increment" or "growth 
cushion" mechanism, allows states to create a "bank" of emission reductions created by 
state regulation of existing sources more stringently than the law would otherwise require. 
[d. § 173(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(I)(B). EPA made no provision for banking of emission 
reductions-saving them for later sale or use-in ita offset policy. For this reason the agency 
decided to amend ita 1976 interpretive ruling. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979) . 
... 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1045-46 (Sept. 21, 1978) . 
... [d. 
180 [d. 
131 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,277 (1979). 
II' [d. Only a handful of states have not received at least "conditional approval" of their 
SIP's. Those states, among them California, that have not received approval are currently 
suing EPA over the agency's decision to reject those plans. See 11 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (Curr. 
Dev.) 667-68 (Sept. 5, 1980). 
II. EPA cited no particular section of the Clean Air Act here but presumably the agency 
had in mind the fact that SIP's are federally enforceable. Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 
7413 (Supp. I 1977) . 
... 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,277 (1979). 
II. "Unlike the PSD provisions, the nonattainment provisions are primarily intended not 
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spite the court's approval of the bubble concept in the PSD pro-
gram, EPA stood firm in its rejection of the concept in the federal 
offset policy, considering its previously stated reasons for excluding 
the bubble concept from the federal offset policy still valid.l8S 
EPA's policy seems rather anamolous. On the one hand, the 
agency wants to discourage using the bubble concept in nonattain-
ment areas, at least until revised SIP's are approved. On the other 
hand, it wants to encourage states to use the bubble concept in the 
same nonattainment areas after the SIP's are approved. 
The encouragement of the adoption of a bubble policy turns on 
the existence of an approved SIP. The reason for this, according to 
EPA, is that there is no guarantee that states will reduce their air 
pollution without an approved SIP. The agency failed to articulate 
what it is about an approved SIP that guarantees pollution reduc-
tion. The fact is that there are considerable guarantees that states 
will do their utmost to reduce pollution in their nonattainment ar-
eas, regardless of when the SIP is approved. There are deadlines to 
meet and standards to attain, and they do not vary according to 
the date of SIP approval. 137 If these fixed standards and deadlines 
are not complied with, states are subject to citizen suits,!as injunc-
tions,139 and the loss of large amounts of federal financial 88sist-
ance.140 
Even if this were not the case, the worst that could happen 
under a bubble policy is that air quality would not change. Under 
all versions of the bubble concept drafted so far air quality is never 
allowed to deteriorate. 
Fortunately, the policy is of limited effect. The use of the bubble 
concept is only temporarily disallowed. Still, the policy cannot be 
helpful; it can only create ambivalence and uncertainty in applying 
the bubble concept in other regulatory areas. 
merely to prevent excessive increases in emissions but to reduce emissions. This fundamen-
tal difference in purpose requires a different approach in defining the sources that will be 
subject to new source review." 44 Fed. Reg. 51,924, 51,932 (1979). 
118 [d. 
II. The deadline for all states to meet the primary NAAQS's is December 31, 1982. Clean 
Air Act § 172(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(I)(Supp. I 1977).There is an extension of five years 
available for the attainment of the ozone and carbon monoxide standards, but only if a long 
list of special conditions is satisfied. [d. § 172(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2). 
'18 [d. § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
,a. [d. § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5). 
, •• The Administrator of EPA can withhold federal highway assistance (other than for 
safety or mass transit projects), id. § 176, 42 U.S.C. § 7506, and federal sewage treatment 
grants, id. § 306, 42 U.S.C. § 7616. 
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D. Revised State Implementation Plans 
As mentioned above, the price of deleting the bubble concept 
from the offset policy was allowing states the freedom to make use 
of the bubble in regulating pollution under an approved SIP. Con-
sequently, on December 11, 1979, EPA issued a policy statement 
defining exactly how states are allowed to apply the bubble con-
cept, or as EPA terms it, the "alternative emission reduction 
option. "If! 
According to the Clean Air Act, states are required, through the 
SIP, to control pollution from new and existing sources so as to 
provide for the expeditious attainment of the national ambient 
standards.141 In doing so, states are allowed to define the quantity 
of emissions permitted from a single source, the types of control 
equipment that must be installed, and the timetable for meeting 
those requirements.148 In practice, states often do not establish 
these requirements as economically as possible. A bubble concept 
applied to this process would allow the states to define the maxi-
mum amount of pollution allowed from a plant, but would leave to 
the plant managers the decisions as to what means should be ap-
plied to achieve the required emission reductions. 144 
This is exactly what the new bubble policy statement allows. It 
provides businesses the opportunity to come forward with their 
own mix of pollution abatement strategies that will result in emis-
sion reductions at the least cost. The policy statement is, however, 
carefully worded to avoid every conceivable possibility of abuse.14' 
As a result, most of the text is devoted to numerous conditions and 
limitations imposed on the use of the bubble concept-so many, in 
fact, that some commentators claim the practical effectiveness of 
this version of the bubble concept may be severely constrained.14e 
.41 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780 (1979) . 
... States are required to include in their SIP's "emission limitations, schedules, and 
timetables for compliance with such limitations and other such measures as may be neces-
sary to insure the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS's." Clean Air Act § 110(a)(I)(A), 
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(I)(A)(Supp. I 1977) . 
••• [d . 
••• For an example of how the bubble concept would apply in this context see text accom-
panying note 8 supra . 
••• See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1611 (Dec. 29, 1978) for Assistant Administrator 
David Hawkins's comments on the need for such conditions and limitations . 
... See 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 2041 (Feb. 22, 1980); Steelmakers Seek U.S. 
Conce88ions, Wall St. J., Feb. I, 1980, at 6, col. 1. 
While the states have some leeway, it is clear that most of the issues were resolved in 
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Most of the conditions, however, are not totally uncalled for. Some 
of them serve to prevent environmental degradation that would oc-
cur if the concept were to be carelessly applied. 
Under this new bubble policy, any new or existing source, in a 
clean or dirty air area, is eligible to suggest different control re-
quirements than those set out in the SIP (EPA suggests that this 
be accomplished at the source's expense.147) provided the source is 
currently in compliance with all applicable SIP requirements.u8 If 
the source is not in compliance then it must either get into compli-
ance or be on an EPA or court-approved compliance schedule.l48 
The agency expressed concern that the bubble policy not be used 
as a delaying tactic to avoid controls and "increase 'the inequity 
between sources that have incurred the expense and difficulty of 
compliance and those that have so far avoided compliance."llo 
Once an alternative emission reduction option has been pro-
posed, the state or local air pollution control agency must evaluate 
it against a number of EPA-defined criteria. First, the proposal 
must not in any way compromise the state's reasonable further 
progress toward the attainment of federal ambient standards. Even 
if the total emissions would not increase under an alternative pro-
posal, it must be disapproved if any violation of the requirement of 
annual incremental reductions of ambient pollution results. III The 
problem here, of course, is making the leap from emissions to am-
bient air quality. A smoke stack emitting 100 tons of a given pollu-
tant does not necessarily increase the ambient concentration of the 
same pollutant by a like amount. Consequently, even though the 
bubble policy is framed in terms of trades in emissions, always 
favor of bureaucratic caution rather than substantial reform. In part, this outcome can 
be ascribed to a lingering distrust of industry. That attitude was apparent when the 
agency announced to the press that it had adopted the bubble policy. David Hawkins, an 
assistant administrator, characterized the agency's actions as telling industry: "Here's 
some responsibility. Demonstrate that you are mature enough to use it." 
Such arrogance would be easier to abide if responsibility were truly bestowed. The 
steel industry had wanted EPA to set a pollution limit for each plant and let the compa-
nies decide how to meet the standards-and bear the responsibility in court. But the 
announced policy requires a company to prove in advance that its system will work 
!while EPA reserves the right of preemptive veto). Rather than being reduced, bureau-
cratic oversight will be increased. 
Nulty, supra note 2, at 123 (emphasis supplied). 
, •• 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780, 71,782 (1979). 
, •• [d. at 71,781. 
... [d. at 71,781-82. 
100 [d. at 71,781. 
,., [d. at 71,782-83. 
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lurking in the wings is a ground rule that attainment of ambient 
standards must not be endangered. 
For the same reason, a second requirement that emission trades 
be "even,"1&2 carries with it a qualification. An even, one-for-one 
trade will suffice only if attainment is in no way threatened. If it is 
found that standards will be threatened, then something greater 
than a one-for-one ratio will be required. us For example, where 
stack heights differ, diffusion characteristics will vary (the higher 
the stack the more easily diffused the emissions) and some adjust-
ment may be required. 
A third condition is that all emissions involved in the alternative 
proposal must be quantifiable. 1M This is to make verification of the 
actual emission reductions by the state control agency (and later, 
EPA) easier. The policy states a preference for direct measurement 
(monitoring), although it allows indirect measurement (model-
ing)1&& if a "clear and convincing link between the emissions and 
other quantifiable measures is demonstrated."1&6 In other words, 
untested, experimental modeling techniques will not be permitted; 
only standard, accepted measurement practices will be approved. 
Fourth, the pollutants traded must be "equivalent."1&7 They 
need not be chemically identical, however trading between criteria 
categories (for example, trading sulfur dioxide emissions for carbon 
monoxide emissions) is not a1lowed. l &8 The main concern is that 
the reasonable further progress requirement not be compromised. 
EPA warned that it will pay close attention to trades involving 
particulates, especially fugitive dust, because of equivalency and 
verification problems. lie 
... Id. at 71,783 . 
.. a Id. 
'M Id. 
••• Monitoring refers to the actual sampling of air pollution concentrations at a given 
location and a given time. Modeling, on the other hand, is a mathematical projection of 
pollution concentrations based on known variables like pollution emission inventories, mete-
orological regimes, and topography. There are a number of different types of models, of 
varying reliability. The differences lie in the number of variables taken into consideration, 
and the relative weight accorded to each. See 1 A. STERN, AIR POLLUTION 3-15, 215-19 (2d 
ed. 1968); C. STEWART, AIR POLLUTION, HUMAN HEALTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12-13, 66-68 
(1979); U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES ON AIR QUALITY MODELS at A1-A34, 48 (1978); Kramer, Air 
Quality Modeling: Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Reactions, 5 COLUM. J. ENVT'L 
L. 236 (1979) . 
• " 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780, 71,783 (1979). 
'07 Id. at 71,784 . 
• " Id . 
... Id. at 71,783. 
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Finally, the adoption of an alternative emission reduction plan 
must not result in any delays in meeting existing compliance or-
ders, enforcement actions, or court decrees. leo Again, the agency 
expressed concern that the policy not be used as a way to thwart 
air pollution control laws. leI 
If an alternative emission reduction plan is approved by the 
state enforcement agency, then it must be proposed as a formal 
revision of the SIP and must be approved by EPA. Ie. The control 
plan, being part of the SIP, then becomes a mandatory, legallyen-
forceable emission limitation. lea 
In addition to these requirements, EPA emphasized several im-
portant points throughout the policy statements. The bubble pol-
icy can be applied only if the SIP has been approved and the state 
maintains reasonable further progress towards the attainment of 
the federal standards. us. To this general statement, however, there 
is one major exception. Under certain undefined circumstances, 
EPA will allow the use of the bubble concept for the control of 
ozone, despite a state's failure to demonstrate attainment of the 
ozone standard by the statutory deadline. In this case an emission 
limitation conforming to "reasonably available control technology" 
is required, and the bubble may be used to define how that limita-
tion is to be achieved.l65 
The bubble policy statement has nothing whatsoever to do with 
either the PSD regulations or the NSPS's: "This policy applies 
only to emission limitations approved or promulgated as a part of 
a SIP. It does not apply to BACT, LAER, NSPS, or other condi-
tions specifically required by the Act."lee In the case of PSD the 
bubble is applied in a completely different way. Under the new 
regulations firms will be allowed to offset emission increases with 
emission reductions in the same plant to avoid having any emis-
sions increases from the plant. The bubble policy statement does 
not deal with the avoidance of emission increases. It deals only 
with how existing emissions will be controlled. Likewise, the 
NSPS's regulations are unaffected. The bubble policy statement 
, •• [d. at 71,784. 
,., [d. at 71,785. 
, •• [d. at 71,786. 
"a [d. at 71,786. 
'84 [d. at 71,782-83. 
"0 EPA provided no explanation for this exception. [d. at 71,781. 
, .. [d. at 71,786. 
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does not apply to new sources, only to existing ones. 
One final provision is worth noting. EPA, in response to a num-
ber of comments, provided that the bubble policy is not limited in 
its application to a single plant. More than one plant may be in-
cluded under the imaginary bubble as long as the plants are in the 
same area. However, it must be demonstrated through modeling 
that air quality will not be adversely impacted by applying the 
bubble concept so broadly.l87 
On the whole, this policy statement offers exciting possibilities 
in the area of "controlled trading"l8. of emission reductions. The 
policy is broadly defined and opens the door to industry to prove 
that it can do a better job of controlling pollution than the 
governement regulators. This only makes sense. A federal agency 
cannot possibly have all of the information about a single source 
that would allow it to make the most efficient decision possible. 
Even the conditions placed on the bubble applicant for the most 
part seem reasonable. There are, however, some defects in the pol-
icy statement that may greatly hamper its effectiveness. 
For example, the requirement that emissions trades must be 
equivalent as defined in the policy statement will likely lead to 
problems, if not litigation. Certainly no one should be allowed to 
trade an increase in a more harmful pollutant for a decrease in a 
more benign one simply because it is cheaper to do so. Moreover, 
firms should not be able to trade between pollutant categories, if 
for no other reason than it is probably illegal,18' But what of trad-
ing increases in a benign pollutant within a certain category for 
increases in a more hazardous one in the same category? The pol-
icy does not address this problem, since the equivalence of trades 
depends not upon the consequent health effects but rather on the 
chemical similarity of the pollutants involved.l70 For all its usual 
II. [d. at 71,788. 
,.. The term is EPA's label for several type. of regulatory reform that are currently under 
consideration, among them banking and trading of emission offsets. See EPA Environmen-
tal News, Dec. 3, 1979, at 4. 
'" Sections 172 and 173 of the Clean Air Act clearly state that increases in emissions in 
nonattainment areas can be allowed only if annual incremental reductions in a pollutant 
category sufficient to represent "reasonable further progress" toward the attainment of stan-
dards are maintained. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502-7503 (Supp. I 1977). The only way a bubble trade 
could result in a net increase in emiBBions of a particular pollutant would seem to be for the 
state to offset the emiBBion increase with a comparable amount and type of emission reduc-
tions from a growth cUlhion. See note 127 supra. 
170 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780, 71,783 (1979). 
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concern for health and welfare, EPA seems to have overlooked an 
important point. More important, where did EPA get the authority 
to regulate pollutants within pollutant categories? EPA at great 
length explains how trades involving fugitive dust and fine particu-
lates are subject to special scrutiny. It is as if there are special 
standards for fugitive dust and special standards for fine particu-
lates.l71 EPA mentions that part of its hesitancy to allow trades 
between fine and coarse particulates is that it may change current 
standards.17I The trouble is that at least for the time being, there 
is only one set of standards for particulates based on total weight, 
not particular size or impact possibility.178 Until EPA decides to 
change the standards themselves it does not seem consistent that 
the agency should be allowed to impose the additional 
requirements. 
An even more troublesome requirement is the one that requires 
each alternative emission reduction proposal to be treated as a re-
vision to the SIP. The requirement is expected to add a full year to 
the process of obtaining approval of an alternative plan.174 It 
should not be forgotten that during that time the source is sup-
posed to maintain compliance with current limitations. EPA de-
fends its reliance on case-by-case SIP revisions by stating that the 
agency is required to review all SIP revisions by the Clean Air 
Act.1711 But the agency's rationale begs the question of why the 
bubble application would necessitate SIP revision in the first place. 
EPA has drawn considerable fire for its stand on this issue.178 
171 Recent research has suggested that smaller particulates are far more dangerous than 
larger ones. While the larger particulates are generally captured by the natural filtering 
processes of the human respiratory system, the smaller particulates may be drawn deep into 
the lungs and remain there for a considerable amount of time, contributing to a variety of 
lung ailments. Fine particulates are also believed to be significant contributors to visibility 
degradation and acid rain. See generally F. PERERA & A. AHMED, RESPIRABLE PARTICLES: 
THE IMPACT or AIRBORNE FINE PARTICULATES ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1978). 
'7' 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780, 71,784 (1979). 
'71 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1979). 
'7' Will EPA Blow the Bubble Concept? 3 LEGAL TIMES or WASH. 1 (July 28, 1980) . 
• 7. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780, 71,786 (1979). The Agency does not refer to any particular sec-
tion. Presumably it meant Clean Air Act § 110(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(3)(A)(Supp. I 1977). 
'7. In May, the Chemical Manufacturer's Association and some New Jersey member firms 
filed suit in the Third Circuit challenging EPA's rejection of the New Jersey SIP because it 
did not provide for EPA review of bubble applications. C.M.A. v. EPA, No. 80-1663. C.M.A. 
is claiming that the Clean Air Act provides the states with the discretion to approve bubble 
proposals and that EPA's decision infringes on the states' powers. The state of New Jersey 
may join in the suit. See Will EPA Blow the Bubble Concept? supra note 174; 11 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 421 (July 18, 1980). 
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There are even rumblings within the agency that this particular 
requirement might be changed.177 
III. THE BUBBLE CONCEPT AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
The acceptance of the bubble concept in the air pollution control 
field has prompted a great deal of speculation whether the same 
concept could not be applied to water pollution control. The prob-
lem, of course, is that an entirely different statutory framework is 
involved, and the existence of unique legal problems may preclude 
the application of this cost-saving tactic to the water pollution con-
trol field. However, it should also be remembered that much com-
monality exists between the Clean Air Act and its clean water 
counterpart. Indeed, it is often noted how one has grown out of the 
other in various stages of development over the last twenty 
years.178 The case can be made for a water pollution bubble con-
cept, but only if this broader perspective as to the relationship be-
tween the control programs is maintained. The Clean Water Act, 
adopted in 1972179 and amended in 1977,180 uses tools similar to 
those in the Clean Air Act to rid the nation's waters of pollution: 
ambient standards and point source limitations. In the case of the 
Clean Water Act, though, the effluent limitations perform the ma-
177 EPA has announced that it is considering avoiding case-by-case review of bubble ap-
plications by publishing additional criteria the states must follow before granting operating 
permits. 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 421 (July 18, 1980). 
"8 "Repeatedly, the programmatic and regulatory features of the water pollution legisla-
tion reflect the legislative ideas applied to air pollution two years earlier." W. ROGERS, supra 
note 58, at 355 (1978). Rogers cites the use of criteria documents, state implementation 
plans, new source performance standards, ambient standards and citizen suits as some of 
many commonalities in federal air and water pollution control. [d. 
"8 The first water pollution control act was passed in 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 
1155 (1948). The Act was then amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498 (1956); Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1961); Water Quality Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 203 (1965); Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). Major revisions came with the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). On the 1972 Amend-
ments see Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 682-791 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). See also Symposium, Water Quality Con-
trol, 7 NAT. RES. L. 225 (1974); Comment, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 17 NAT. RES. J. 511 (1977); Comment, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, (1973) WIse. L. REV. 893. 
180 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 
Stat. 1566, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. I 1977). The entire amended act is hereinafter cited as 
Clean Water Act. 
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jor clean up work,18l while the ambient water quality standards 
form a second line of defense.18s Each "point source" is assigned 
through the "national pollutant discharge elimination system" 
(NPDES) permit process/8S a series of technology-based limita-
tions on the amount of e1Huents that can be discharged. Over the 
course of a number of years, these e1Huent limitations become in-
creasingly stringent184 until the goal of "no discharges" is ulti-
mately attained.1811 The question is whether the Clean Water Act 
defines the term "point source" in such a way as to accommodate 
the bubble concept. In other words, can the technology-based e1Hu-
ent limitations be applied to whole plants as opposed to individual 
pipes and processes, allowing firms to determine how to comply 
with the total allowable discharges? It is essentially the same ques-
tion as that faced in ASARCO and Alabama Power. The special 
problem presented by the Clean Water Act is that in the general 
definition section "point source" is quite narrowly defined. Section 
502(14) includes among other things "any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance" from which pollutants are emitted.18s 
.a. While improved water quality was, of course, the ultimate goal of the Act, it had 
proven to be a difficult basis for regulatory and enforcement action. It was recognized there-
fore that the problem of water pollution had to be dealt with at the point of discharge-i.e., 
at the industrial or municipal source. Hall, Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RES. L. 343, 
343 (1978). 
'11 The water quality standards are not neceBBarily federally imposed, nor are they uni-
form, nor are they solely health related, as in the case of the Clean Air Act. The Clean 
Water Act instead provides for "water quality related effluent limitations" for a "specific 
portion" of a navigable waterway to "assure protection of public water supplies, agricultural 
and industrial uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shell-
fish, fish, and wildlife .... " Clean Water Act § 302(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a)(1976). In addi-
tion, states are required to establish and periodically revise water quality standards for all 
navigable waterways in the state. [d. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976) . 
... [d. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). 
... Existing sources, for example, are regulated in two phases. The first phase requires 
sources to comply with a technology-based effluent limitation conforming to "best practica-
ble control technology currently available." This is supposed to be accomplished by July 1, 
1977. [d. § 301(a)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1)(A)(1976). Case-by-case extensions to 1979 
can be granted by EPA. [d. § 309(a)(5)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(B)(Supp. I 1977). The 
second phase imposes a more stringent standard to be achieved generally by July 1, 1984. 
The exact nature of the standard varies according to three different categories of pollutants: 
industries that discharge toxic and "unconventional" pollutants must achieve the "best 
available technology economically achievable"; discharges of conventional pollutants must 
be controlled to the extent of "best conventional pollutant control technology." [d. §§ 
301(b)(2)(A) & 301(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A) & 1311(b)(2)(E) (1976) . 
... "It is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be elimi-
nated by 1985." [d. § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976) . 
... [d. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1262(14) (1976). 
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EPA has neither proposed nor adopted a definition of "point 
source" that would allow the use of the bubble concept in the 
NPDES program.187 However, the matter has been the subject of 
hot debate within the agency itself. 
The debate began with a memorandum from Joan Z. Bernstein, 
former EPA General Counsel, in the legality of a water pollution 
bubble concept.188 In this memo, General Counsel Bernstein ag-
gressively defended this new application of the bubble concept. 
The crux of her argument was that although section 502(14) ex-
presses a very limited definition of "point source," the use of the 
term elsewhere in the Act suggests a much more expansive treat-
ment.189 For example, section 306 requires new source performance 
standards for new "sources," which are defined as "any building, 
structure, facility or installation . . . . "190 And the same section 
treats the terms "source" and "point source" synonymously.191 
Moreover, she pointed out that the legislative history of the Clean 
Water Act often treated the term "point source" synonymously 
with the terms "industries" and "plants."192 Finally, she argued 
that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the same rea-
soning. In American Food Institute v. Trainl93 the court com-
mented on section 306 that "this same standard, i.e., best available 
technology, is mandated forthwith for all new plant construction 
(new point sources) .... "19. 
The Bernstein memo was followed by a scathing critique from 
Edward Kurent, legal advisor to the EPA Enforcement Division.191 
187 EPA has gone only so far as to ask several industries involved in litigation with the 
agency to come up with water bubble proposals as potential points of agreement in settle-
ment negotiations. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 2087 (March 7, 1980). 
188 Memorandum to Thomas Jorling, Assistant Administrator for Water and Hazardous 
Materials, from Joan Bernstein, General Counsel, Legality of the "Bubble Concept" under 
Clean Water Act, reprinted in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1659-60 (Jan. 5, 1979)[here-
inafter cited as Bernstein Memo with pagination corresponding to reprinting]. 
18. Id. citing Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)(1976). 
I •• Clean Water Act § 306(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3)(1976). 
,., Section 306, dealing with new source performance standards, says "any point source 
the construction of which is commenced after the date of enactment" of the 1972 Amend-
ments is not subject to certain more stringent standards as of "the date of completion of 
such facility." Id. § 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d) (1976). The Act seems to equate the broad 
term "facility" with "point source." 
, •• Bernstein memo, supra note 188, at 1659. 
, •• 539 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
, •• Id. at 1116. 
, •• Memorandum from Edward Kurent, Attorney-Advisor, to Assistant Administrator for 
Enforcement, Critique of OGC Memorandum, reprinted in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. 
- - ------------
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The thrust of the Kurent memo was that ASARCa196 precluded 
any thought of a water pollution bubble concept. The fallacy of the 
Bernstein memo, it was argued, was in the apparent syllogism that 
she attempted to apply: "Presumably, General Counsel further 
concludes that 'building, structure, facility or installation' is synon-
ymous with 'plant.' ... Unfortunately, this syllogism will not 
withstand close scrutiny in light of ASARCa . ... "197 ASARCa, 
said Kurent, concluded that a "building, structure, facility or in-
stallation" was not synonymous with an entire plant. The minor 
premise being fallacious, the entire syllogism falls. 198 
The problem with Kurent's analysis is that the minor premise is 
not false. In a footnote to the majority opinion, ASARCa expressly 
approved an EPA definition of the term "facility" that encom-
passed entire plants.199 This footnote was buttressed by identical 
statements in the text of Alabama Power, which cited the 
ASARCa footnote.lIoo The General Counsel's syllogism, then, ap-
pears to be quite valid. 
Kurent also criticized the Bernstein memo for its reliance on the 
wrong legislative history.2Ol All of the General Counsel's citations 
were taken from the legislative history of the 1972 Act. This rea-
soning is rather elusive, since the sections referred to in the Bern-
stein memo, although from the 1972 Act, were not at all altered by 
the 1977 Amendments. 
The memo also criticized the bubble concept as being contrary 
to the purpose of setting technology-based effluent limitations. Ec-
onomic relief, said Kurent, is to be a factor only in setting the 
standards. Thereafter, economics is not to be a fair consideration 
within the statutory framework of the Clean Water Act.IIOIi This, 
however, seems to misstate both the Actll03 and the bubble concept. 
Economic considerations in setting the standards have nothing to 
Dev.) 1660-62 (Jan. 5, 1979)[hereinafter cited as Kurent Memo with pagination correspond-
ing to reprinting). . 
.06 See text accompanying notes 30-46 supra . 
• 07 Kurent Memo, supra note 195, at 1661. 
••• Id . 
... See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra. 
I •• See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra. 
I •• Kurent Memo, supra note 195, at 1661. 
1.1 Id. 
1.8 For example, the Clean Water Act allows EPA to modify effluent standards on the 
basis on the economic capability of a firm to comply. See Clean Water Act § 301(c), 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). 
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do with the bubble concept. The former involves setting the 
amount of allowable discharge, the latter merely allows some flex-
ibility in meeting that standard. Economics would in no way lessen 
the responsibility of the polluter, as Kurent seemed to fear; it 
would simply allow the polluter to perform its obligation in the 
most cost-effective manner. 
Finally, Kurent suggested that as a practical matter, EPA simply 
has considered the Clean Water Act's references to "point source" 
to mean anything but individual outfalls. "To suggest that a plant 
is a point source is to ignore the fact that a plant is a combination 
of point sources and has been treated as such by EPA for five years 
since the passage of the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA."I04 
This is certainly true. In fact, Bernstein's memo conceded that cur-
rent EPA regulations would have to be modified to accommodate a 
water bubble program.IOIL However, the fact that EPA has never 
considered the bubble concept in this context is not totally disposi-
tive of the issue. There was no record of EPA allowing states to use 
the bubble concept in developing their SIP's. Yet the agency has 
enthusiastically promoted the application of the bubble concept in 
that area of pollution control. And despite the fact that EPA had 
not previously considered applying a bubble concept to its PSD 
program, it did so anyway. Indeed the Alabama Power decision ex-
panded the applicability of the bubble concept in PSD regulations. 
In the months that followed, further memos were exchanged on 
the subject.lo, Each, however, basically voiced support for and reit-
erated the arguments of one or the other of the two memos de-
scribed above. At one point, former Senator Edmund Muskie, 
ranking member of the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works, received word of the EPA debate.IO? Aggressively 
entering the fray, Muskie voiced strong objections to the idea of a 
water pollution bubble policy. Declaring that the policy "is not a 
legal option," he said it "has the potential of reversing progress 
already gained in pollution control, would be disruptive of clean-up 
efforts, and would make enforcement of the statute very diffi-
.... Kurent memo, supra note 195, at 1661. 
- Bernstein memo, supra note 188, at 1660 . 
... The memoranda are reprinted in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1662-65 (Jan. 5, 
1979) . 
••• Memo to Senator Edmund Muskie from Sally Walker and Karl Braithwaite, EPA's 
Proposed Water Bubble Policy, reprinted in id. at 1901 (Feb. 2, 1979). 
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cult."lIoa Why this would be the case, Muskie did not explain. The 
bubble concept, by very definition allows no increases in overall 
pollution from a source, so it is difficult to imagine how pollution 
control programs would be reversed or disrupted. As for enforce-
ment problems, the senator has not suggested why Water Act en-
forcement would be any more difficult under a bubble policy than 
would Air Act enforcement. 
All of this is not to say that there are no impediments to the 
adoption of a bubble concept in water pollution control programs. 
There are significant hurdles. The philosophy underlying the Clean 
Water Act is different from that of the Clean Air Act. There is an 
emphasis on effluent limitations, with ambient standards taking a 
decidedly secondary role.IIOs Too, there is a goal expressed in the 
Clean Water Act that ultimately there should be no discharge of 
pollutants at all. 110 
Even these considerations, however, should not stand in the way 
of adopting a water pollution bubble policy. Simply because the 
Clean Water Act envisions an eventual no discharge standard does 
not mean that until that standard is realized the bubble concept 
should not be utilized. The bubble concept does not impede pro-
gress toward the ultimate no discharge goal; it simply provides in-
dustries the flexibility to determine the most cost-effective way to 
achieve it. Under the Clean Air Act, emission limitations become 
increasingly stringent as the state of pollution control technology 
develops.211 Yet, the bubble concept has not been viewed as an im-
pediment to the development of those more stringent standards. If 
this is the case in air pollution control, there would seem to be no 
reason for different treatment in water pollution control. 
Whether EPA will ultimately adopt a water pollution bubble 
policy is a good question. Memos exchanged in the last months of 
1978 suggest that the problem is not whether a bubble concept will 
be applied, but in what form it will appear. Furthermore, EPA Ad-
ministrator Costle's penchant for regulatory reform bodes well for 
the future of a water pollution bubble concept.2111 
Still, no proposed policy has appeared in the last year. Whether 
EPA will be bold enough to do so remains to be seen. The agency 
.... [d. at 1815. 
I.. See note 181 supra. 
110 See note 185 supra. 
III See note 184 supra. 
I .. See Costle, supra note 120, at 7. 
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did not fare well in its last major court challenge. Bernstein no 
longer works for EPA. And in an election year, it is hard to tell 
which way the chips will fall. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Although often hailed as a new and innovative regulatory tech-
nique, the bubble concept has been around for quite a long time in 
one form or another. And it promises to be a permanent fixture in 
EPA's regulatory scheme. This development is to be applauded. 
The logic and economic good sense of the bubble concept are man-
ifest. The concept is certainly more of a dream than a nightmare. 
By definition, the bubble concept maintains the quality of the na-
tion's air and water, while allowing industries to meet government 
regulations as inexpensively as possible. 
Still, there have been consistent challenges that the bubble con-
cept has no place in the nation's pollution control efforts. Why 
these challenges continue is difficult to pinpoint, for there has been 
little explanation of the environmentalist position.218 In the courts, 
the main thrust of the opposition has been based on the ruling of 
the ASARCO case that the bubble concept is simply illegal.n & This 
foundation, as this article has attempted at some length to demon-
strate, is not very helpful since the ASARCO case itself is seriously 
weakened by internal inconsistencies.2111 Are there more practical 
reasons for the objections to the bubble concept? There do seem to 
be some noteworthy concerns. 
First, there is a likelihood that the implementation of a bubble 
policy will entail significant personnel increases in state and fed-
eral enforcement agencies.218 Someone, after all, has to verify that 
trade-offs in emissions increases will in fact be comparable and 
permanent. No enforcement agency is likely to simply take the 
III Most of the criticism has been fairly pointed but without much analysis. Consider, for 
example, W. ROGBRS, supra note 58, at 273 n.37, which'states that the Clean Air Act does 
not make room for a bubble concept because "surely [it] does not mean to tolerate a horren-
dously controlled new facility because of a fortuity that has led to the coincidental shut-
down of 90 percent of the other capacity at a given source." This is simply begging the 
question. The statement is of little help since there is no explanation or analysis to support 
it. 
lie See text accompanying notes 78, 196-98 supra. 
III See text accompanying notes 42-44, 54-60 supra. 
III See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas Jorling, Assistant Administrator, to Douglas 
Costle, EPA Administrator, Application of the Bubble Concept to the NPDES Program, 
reprinted in 9 Erma. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 1663 (Jan. 5, 1979). 
1980] BUBBLE CONCEPT 779 
word of an affected industry. 
Second, there is concern that the implementation of a bubble 
policy will turn the standard-setting process into a series of bar-
gaining sessions between agencies and industries, and that this is 
somehow inappropriate to the absolutes of the nation's health-
based pollution control program. Some have expressed fear that in 
this bargaining process the permitting agencies, usually staffed by 
"relatively junior" personnel, will be subjected to undue pressure 
from affected industries'!U7 
Third, there are references by bubble policy critics to threats of 
environmental degradation and potential public health hazards if 
the policy is supported. The exact nature of these threats, however, 
is never elaborated,!usFourth, there are concerns that bubble trans-
actions will be difficult to verify and to enforce. Firms could con-
ceivably reduce pollution from one stack to make room for in-
creases in another, and then after approval, simply increase 
both.ue 
Finally, there seems to be a great deal of simple mistrust of the 
ability of industries to comply with the bubble policy in good faith. 
There is fear that firms will use the policy to avoid compliance as 
long as possible, that the bubble policy will only provide another 
tool with which businesses can prolong the litigation process.220 
These criticisms are not totally without foundation. However, 
they do not seem to provide sufficient reason to ignore the benefits 
that implementation of a bubble policy in any number of forms 
could provide. 
Nearly every environmental quality program requires some 
amount of public outlay. If staffing considerations were controlling 
there probably would be a much different Clean Air Act. Moreover, 
the costs of staffing a bubble program must be weighed against the 
costs of not having a bubble program. Firms stand to save a great 
deal of money at no environmental cost. Since the public nearly 
always eventually bears the cost of controlling pollution, any re-
duction in the cost of that control should be a welcome event. Ref-
erence to the problems of dealing with junior personnel seems 
, .. Id. 
"8 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund at 75-76, 
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 13 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 
... Id. 
, •• See Comment, EPA's Widening Embrace of the "Bubble" Concept: The Legality and 
Availability of Intra-source Tradeoffs, 9 ENvT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10027, 10027 (1979). 
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somewhat specious. The only reason junior personnel are delegated 
the permitting job is that the process is rather perfunctory in most 
agencies. The simple answer to a change in the job description is to 
change the personnel. 
In the same vein, the hazards of negotiating standards are prob-
ably overestimated. Negotiation of standards is certainly nothing 
new. NAAQS's221 and BACT,m for example, have all been set after 
extensive debate over scientific evidence, energy implications, and 
economic impact. In that regard, the bubble concept would present 
no unique difficulty. 
The concern with the preservation of environmental quality is 
an important one. But it is not easy to understand how the imple-
mentation of a bubble program would present a great environmen-
tal hazard. By very definition, the concept allows only trade-off's 
among like pollutants. Unequal trades are not allowed. The only 
possible environmental threat would come if EPA allowed trades 
of pollutants of unequal impact on the environment. In other 
words if an increase in a hazardous pollutant were to be traded for 
a decrease in a more benign one the net effect would be a greater 
threat to public health despite the equivalence in pollutant quanti-
ties. The answer to this potential problem is to proscribe trade-off's 
that would result in a net hazard to the public despite an even 
trade in pollution quantity. This is an important consideration but 
certainly not an insurmountable one. 
The concern with potential verification and enforcement 
problems is a valid one. But it is certainly not sufficient reason to 
dispose of the bubble concept. In any type of pollution control ver-
ification and enforcement is a problem. There is always a risk of 
non-compliance. Indeed a certain amount of non-compliance could 
be virtually guaranteed. That does not stop most pollution control 
... Ambient standards are based on "such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of 
safety [as) are requisite to protect the public health." Clean Air Act § 109(b)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(b)(I)(Supp. I 1977). Exactly what is an "adequate margin of safety" and what is "req-
uisite to protect public health" are the subjects of considerable debate in the case of each of 
the criteria pollutants. Moreover, there is evidence that presidential economic advisors may 
exert some influence over the standard setting function. For an example of the debates that 
ensue over the setting of ambient air quality standards, see Comment, Ambient Air Stan-
dards for Lead and Ozone: Scientific Problems and Economic Pressures, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. 
REV. 261 (1979) . 
... BACT is an emission limitation set "on a case-by-case basis, taking into account en-
ergy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs." Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 
U.S.C. § 7509(3)(Supp. I 1977). By definition, determining this emission limitation is a bar-
gaining process. 
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programs. More important, the trade-off process in the bubble con-
cept is quite similar to that involved in the offset policy. Yet the 
offset policy has received surprisingly little criticism, particularly 
concerning enforcement problems. It is a problem, to be sure. But 
again, it is not unsolvable. 
As for the general suspicion of businesses, little can be said. Cer-
tainly there have been numerous examples of industries attempt-
ing to outwit the enforcement agencies. However, it must be con-
sidered that the businesses have been provided with few incentives 
to do otherwise. The bubble concept at least offers firms an incen-
tive to develop effective pollution control technology at the least 
cost. 
To be sure, the bubble concept is not a flawless cure-all to the 
nation's pollution problems. Nevertheless, it does offer a practical, 
common-sense solution to some of the difficulties that have accom-
panied recent pollution control programs, particularly the high 
cost of those controls. At a time when cost consideration demands 
increasing attention to the development of regulatory programs, 
EPA and the states would be well advised to consider a program 
that gives cost-effectiveness a greater role in the development of 
pollution controls.223 Indeed this next year in particular-the year 
Congress reconsiders the whole Clean Air Act-it might behoove 
pollution control agencies to be more considerate of control costs. 
Industry lobbying groups are already preparing for a frontal as-
sault on the current air pollution control program, primarily be-
cause of the costs of control.22• The bubble concept may provide 
just the kind of compromise that can prevent any major upheaval 
and that can produce the cement to form a lasting program to con-
trol the nation's air and water pollution . 
••• In fact, Alfred Kahn, Chairman of the Council of Wage and Price Stability, recently 
announced that a "regulatory budget" may be imposed on EPA. This budget would place a 
yearly limit on the dollar value of the regulatory burden EPA could impose. 11 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 60 (May 15, 1980) . 
••• See 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 268-69 (June 20, 1980); 10 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA)(Curr. Dev.) 2216 (April 4, 1980). Major overhaul of the Clean Air Act is also a plank 
of the new Republican Party Platform. 
